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Abstract 
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sectors driven by uneven TFP growth in market and home production. We focus on the 
structural transformation between agriculture, manufacturing and services and on the 
marketization of home production. The model can rationalize the observed falling or U-
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A feature of modern economic growth is the changing trend in total hours of work.
In the early stages of modern growth total hours typically fall. In later stages trends
become less clear-cut, with no systematic overall dynamic pattern. In the United States
the trend over the last century appears to be a shallow U-shape, a steep decline followed
by a small rise. In other countries there is a monotonic decline, although one that flattens
out as growth progresses. A “stylized fact” of low-frequency fluctuations in market hours
is that modern economic growth causes a long-lasting decline in mean hours, which
eventually dissipates. Figure 1 uses data from the website of the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre and shows average weekly hours of work for the population
of working age. We show data for 1960-2004 for the United States and the biggest
European economies. The main fact of a declining trend that either slows down or
reverses is evident. Even more striking is the decline in hours before 1960, in the earlier
stages of economic growth. Table 1 also shows weekly hours of work for the population
of working age but for earlier periods. The rate of decline in the late 19th and early
20th century is striking.1
The changing trends in aggregate hours that one finds in long runs of data are
usually neglected by modern growth theory.2 A seemingly unrelated feature of modern
growth is structural transformation: the decline of agriculture and the rise of services,
with relatively smaller changes in industrial employment. In this paper we propose a
framework for the study of these two phenomena and posit that they are part of the
same economic process: the response of hours of work to the uneven distribution of
technological change across production sectors located in the market and the home.3
In our model work can be done both in the market and the home. We refer to the
hours allocated to market work as the supply of labour and assume that it produces
both consumption goods and capital goods. The time allocated to home production
produces consumption goods by using capital goods purchased in the market but it
1The initial decline in market hours is typically driven by a rapid fall in the number of hours of work
by those at work. In the United States this process went on until about 1940. The decline of agricultural
employment, however, also contributes to the decline of total hours, through the withdrawal of some
workers from the labour force, especially women and children. In more recent times there has been an
increase in the labour force participation of women, which increased overall hours in the United States
but less so in the European countries, where hours per employee continued to fall. See Durand (1975,
esp. ch. 4) and Maddison (1995) for cross-country evidence and Goldin (1995) for female labour supply
in the US time series and in other countries.
2A typical comment in the growth literature is the following one, due to Cooley and Prescott (1995,
p.16): “In balanced-growth consumption, investment and capital all grow at a constant rate while hours
stay constant. This behavior is consistent with the growth observations described earlier.”
3Structural transformation has been studied by many authors. See Kuznets (1966) and Baumol
(1967) for early contributions and Echevarria (1997), Kongsamut et al.(2001) and Ngai and Pissarides
(2004) for more recent work. Home production has been studied extensively in a partial context, starting
with Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977). More recently it has been studied in the context of equilibrium
business cycles and to some extent in the context of growth (see Gronau 1997 for a survey and Parente
et al. 2000 and Gollin et al. 2000 for growth-related work).
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Table 1: Weekly hours of work, population of working age
Year USA France Italy UK
1890 35.9 39.7 43.4 35.4
1913 31.4 37.1 40.1 32.5
1929 27.3 32.0 32.0 26.9
1938 20.2 24.7 26.3 28.5
1960 23.8 25.1 24.2 28.5
The numbers shown are for the average weekly number of hours of market work for ages 15-64. Sources:
Maddison (1995) for total hours and Mitchell (1980) and US Historical Statistics for the working age
population.
is not part of the conventional definition of labour supply. We show that because of
the uneven distribution of technological change the division of total work time between
market and home is likely to change during the course of economic development. In
our benchmark economy these changes drive the changes in aggregate labour supply.
Under plausible conditions the time allocated to market production is likely to decrease
in the early stages of modern growth but eventually it will increase. The prediction of
a changing trend in the number of market hours is unique to our model: although a
variety of mechanisms can yield a fall in market hours during economic growth, such as
a rise in the returns to education or a rise in the demand for leisure, to our knowledge
no model has been able to explain the turning point in market hours that we get from
the substitutions between home and market production.
The intuition behind our results derives from the key assumption that although mar-
ket activities at the disaggregation level of agriculture, manufacturing and services pro-
duce goods that are poor substitutes for each other, home production produces mainly
goods that are close substitutes for goods produced in the market. Our utility function
is defined over three composite goods, respectively corresponding to agricultural, man-
ufacturing and service goods. Each composite is a basket of two goods, one of which
is produced in the market and the other in the home. At the level of composites, em-
ployment is moving from agriculture and (eventually) manufacturing towards services,
a process known as structural transformation. The reason is technology: because com-
posite goods are poor substitutes for each other, employment moves to the sector with
lowest TFP growth. But within each composite production is moving from the home to
the market, a process that we call the marketization of home production. The reason
for marketization is that TFP growth in the market is at least as high as TFP growth in
the home, and given the high substitutability between the market- and home-produced
goods, production eﬃciency requires that work be transferred from the home to the
market. Combining these two forces we find that the home components of agricultural
and manufacturing production, such as the cultivation of one’s own food and the making
of one’s own clothes, are losing hours over time because both forces work against them.
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In contrast, the home component of services, such as cooking and shopping, is gaining
hours because of the structural transformation in favour of total services, but as with
the other sectors losing hours because of marketization. The tension between these two
forces drives the dynamics of overall market hours. It explains why home production of
agricultural and manufacturing goods disappears quickly and why the home production
of services may rise at first but fall later.
We summarize US historical evidence that shows that the home production of agri-
cultural and manufacturing goods practically disappeared in the first quarter of the 20th
century. When this happened there was still a large agricultural sector so there was still
a large movement of labour from agriculture to services. As agricultural employment
declined, the hours of work allocated to the home production of services increased, albeit
less than the increase in the hours allocated to the market production of services, which
also benefited from marketization. Examples of home production that gained hours
include cleaning, household administration, shopping and child care.4 But eventually,
as agricultural employment shrank and the home service production sector grew, the
marketization force became larger and dominated the structural transformation force,
bringing a fall in the size of the home production sector. This process can explain an
inverted U-shape for home production hours and reflecting this, a U-shape for market
hours. If, for reasons not specified in our model, initially women are more likely to
engage in home production than men are, these dynamic patterns can explain the fall
in male hours of work in the first half of the century and the rise in female employment
in the second.
In our benchmark model we make the conventional assumption that non-work time
(i.e., all time other than market or home production) enters the utility function directly,
and our utility function is such that in growth equilibrium non-work time is constant.
During periods of transition to an aggregate balanced-growth equilibrium - following for
example war or some other major event that disturbs the initial growth equilibrium -
changes in non-work time also contribute to changes in aggregate labour supply, but
these periods cannot explain the long swings in labour supply that is the topic of this
paper. We report calibrations with the steady state of our model which show that in the
United States at least, substitutions between market sectors and between the market
and the home can explain virtually all of the dynamics of sectoral employment shares
and a significant part of the dynamics of market hours.
In an extension, however, we show how the model can yield a rising leisure time
even when the economy is on a balanced growth path. The reason for pursuing this
extension is that the substitutions between market and home do not explain the entire
evolution in market hours, and it is plausible that some part of the big fall in hours of
4For example, Mokyr (2000) writes that at the beginning of the 20th century there was an increased
demand for cleaner homes and better-prepared food, which required more home-production time. See
section 1 for more historical evidence.
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market work that has taken place since the beginning of the 20th century was matched
by rising leisure.5 The idea behind this extension is to divide leisure time into two
components, one that is the pure enjoyment of time, as in conventional theory, and one
that is enjoyment of time obtained with the help of some capital input. In the first group
there are activities like spending time with friends or playing with one’s children. In
the second there are activities like watching TV and surfing the net. The key diﬀerence
between the second leisure component and home production is that home production
produces goods that have close substitutes in the market, whereas leisure production
has no close market substitutes. One cannot outsource TV watching time. We show
that the extended model implies a rising “leisure production time,” which gives a rising
overall leisure time. Consequently, market hours either fall faster or rise less than in our
benchmark model.
Our model’s explanation of the recent rise in labour supply is diﬀerent from the one
put forward by Greenwood et al. (2005) and more in line with the marketization force
in Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and Rogerson (2004). Greenwood et al. show in a
partial equilibrium model that labour supply increased because of substitutions from
labour to capital in the home following a fall in the price of durable goods. In our model
the price of durable goods also falls because of higher TFP growth in manufacturing
than in services, but the substitution of capital for labour is not the driving force for
the decline in home production time. The driving force is the marketization that takes
place because similar goods can be produced more eﬃciently in the market. Of course,
the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. An example that is consistent with our
explanation is the observation that in the United States people consume more restaurant
food than in Europe, where more food is prepared at home (see Freeman and Schettkat
2005 for more evidence of this kind).6
Section 1 examines some of the history of home production in the United States
and discusses what types of goods are produced at home. Section 2 describes in detail
our benchmark model, paying particular attention to the marketization and structural
5For example, it is unlikely that the big fall in weekly hours for the employed that took place in the
first half of the century was matched one for one with a rise in home production time or education and
training. For more formal evidence of rising leisure for individual groups in the post-war period see
Robinson and Godbey (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst (2005). We do not attempt to say anything about
the increase in education time because it would require a diﬀerent type of model from the one that we
have.
6A full test of the merits of each hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. Two potential tests
are (1) a detailed examination of the relation between the introduction of household appliances and
the decline of paid domestic help. Were household appliances “engines of liberation” for the housewife
or “engines of job destruction” for low skilled labour? (2) A detailed examination of the behaviour of
wages. In a decentralized economy our model would predict that women leave home production and join
market production because female wages are rising. In the Greenwood et al. explanation the increased
eﬃciency of home production releases time, which is now supplied to the market, so the impact should
be from the increased supply of female labour to wages.
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transformation forces that shape the dynamics of hours. Section 3 discusses empirical
implications and a numerical calibration based on US data on market shares and ag-
gregate market hours. Section 4 discusses an extension with a richer leisure model that
gives more general results about the dynamic behaviour of aggregate labour supply. In
the concluding section we discuss some extensions, paying particular attention to the
role of taxation and other distortions in the dynamics of labour supply.
1 What is home production?
Home production is defined as time spent on the production of goods and services, usu-
ally at home but sometimes outside, for one’s own use. Two important properties of home
production are (a) the individual derives utility from the output of home production but
not from the time that she spends on it, and (b) home production can be “marketized”,
i.e., someone else can be paid to do it and the individual can still derive the same utility
from its output. In contrast, leisure cannot be marketized, the individual has to spend
the time herself to enjoy it.
It is important for our modelling that we know the relation between the goods pro-
duced at home and the goods produced in the market. The recent literature has focused
mainly on aggregate models with one market good and one home-produced good, and
argued convincingly that the two aggregates are close substitutes for each other.7 Here
we have three market goods, agricultural goods, manufactures and services. How are
home-produced goods related to each one of these? The early literature on home pro-
duction was concerned with these issues, and a lot of useful information can be obtained
from it.8
Obvious home production activities are cleaning, cooking and child care. In the
early stages of economic development people also grew their own crops, kept small farm
animals, made clothes and preserved food (Leeds 1917, Reid 1934). The crops grown
at home were close substitutes for the output of the agricultural sector, and the clothes
and food preservation were substitutes for manufacturing goods. There is overwhelming
evidence, however, that in modern industrial societies virtually all home production is
a substitute for services. These activities include shopping, looking after children and
other relatives and administration (keeping bank accounts, dealing with bills, etc.).
Contemporary writers argue convincingly that with urbanization home-grown crops
and rearing of small animals for food disappeared as home economic activities, even for
those who worked on the farms. Of course, it would be unreasonable to argue that farm
owners and farm workers do not consume any of their own products. But these products
7The most commonly used substitution elasticities between the two are in the range 1.5-2.3. See Ru-
pert, Rogerson andWright (1995), McGrattan, Rogerson andWright (1997), and Chang and Schorfheide
(2003).
8See among others, Leeds (1917), Reid (1934), Vanek (1973) and Labergott (1993).
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are grown for the market and are not the output of home production. In the statistics on
farm employment the time devoted to growing this component of own food consumption
is counted as market work, not non-market economic activity. The most data-consistent
way to interpret the consumption of crops by those employed on the farms is as payment
in kind.9
The home production of manufacturing goods was also overtaken by modern man-
ufacturing technology early on in the industrialization process. Reid (1934 p.45) made
the point forcefully: “After 1800 economic conditions changed rapidly. Roads improved
steadily. Trade increased. Modern inventions made the most eﬃcient tools too expen-
sive for small-scale household use. Steam power possible only for centralized industries
brought about the withdrawal of much manufacturing from the home.” Some home man-
ufacturing activities, however, survived into the twentieth century. Leeds (1917) writes
that in his sample of 60 families in Pennsylvania, most families reported 2 to 3 hours a
week making clothes for their own use. Although this included the work of paid domestic
helpers, this was also an activity undertaken by the housewife.10 But seventeen years
later, Reid (1934, p.47) summarized as follows the then-state of household production:
“As time went on, one form of production after another, spinning, weaving, ... and
other [manufacturing] tasks have wholly or in part been transferred to commercial pro-
duction. In addition, child care, education, and the care of the sick are now to a large
extent carried on by paid workers.” In similar vein, Lebergott (1993, p.60) writes about
the advent of “consumerism”, by quoting a 1932 paper by Viva Belle Boothe, as argu-
ing that “modern industrial processes have robbed the home of almost every vestige of
its former economic function.” Lebergott continued by noting that the remaining home
work “consists largely of services.”
The principal current home-production activities in the United States are shown in
Table 2. These are all activities whose products are classified as services and which
have close substitutes in the market services sector. No item in present-day time use
surveys, either in Europe or elsewhere in the industrialized world, lists an activity that
yields products that can be classified as either agricultural or manufacturing goods. The
biggest item in the American surveys is shopping, followed by caring for other people in
9See Historical Statistics of the United States, Chapter D on labour: “Employed persons comprise:
(a) all those who, during the survey week, worked at all as paid employee, in their own business or
profession or on their own farm.” Reid (1934, p. 48-51) argues that in the United States growing food
specifically for own consumption disappeared as early as the 1920s. In the 1930 census of agriculture,
the average proportion of total farm produce used by the operator’s family was 13.6%. But this was
mainly market-grown food. “Home production farms”, by which we mean small holdings that the
owners used primarily to grow their own food, amounted to a mere 8% of all farms. Reid calls these
“self-suﬃcing farms” and defines them as farms that the owners consumed over 50% of output. In 1929
the average proportion of own consumption on these farms was 66.1%.
10The total weekly hours of work in the household by the “housewife and her assistants, whether
hired or members of the family” is 101.75 hours. 5.75 hours are for making clothes, and the rest are for
activities that can only be classified as services. See Leeds (1917, p.67).
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Table 2: Weekly hours of home production, American Time Use Survey
Activity Hours Activity Hours
Housework 4.23 Purchasing goods 5.67
and Services
Food preparation 3.64 Caring for household 3.83
and clean up members
Garden care 1.36 Caring for non-household 1.96
members
Household 0.95
management Total 21.64
The numbers shown are for the average weekly number of hours of home work for the population aged
15 and over for 2003 and 2004. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/tus/, Table 1.
and out of the household (presumably children and parents or relations living elsewhere).
Moreover, although the time devoted to sub-categories changed over time,11 the broad
categories of activities have not changed significantly since the 1930s.
In view of the historical evidence and evidence from modern time-use surveys, a good
model of the allocation of time has to explain the reasons that home agricultural and
manufacturing production have disappeared in modern industrial societies. It also has
to explain why service production at home is surviving in such big numbers. We now
describe such a model. As anticipated by the early writers, the driver is technology.
2 A growth model with trends in hours
Our argument can be developed in a simplified model where market work takes place
in three diﬀerentiated sectors. An extension to more sectors is straightforward, at some
notational cost. Agriculture and services produce only consumption goods. Total factor
productivity growth is high in agriculture and low in services. Manufacturing produces
the economy’s capital stock and a consumption good. Home production can also produce
three consumption goods with diﬀerentiated technologies, each of which is a good sub-
stitute for each of the consumption goods produced in the market. Capital goods cannot
be produced in the home. Time has three uses - it can be used in market production,
in home production or in leisure.12
11For example, there is now less time spent on cleaning and laundry but more time on shopping and
household administration. See Vanek (1973) and Robinson and Godbey (1997).
12Thus we ignore the biggest fraction of the week, which is spent on essential physiological activities,
mainly sleep, and which shows remarkable stability over time and across countries (about 70 hours).
We also ignore schooling. See Juster and Staﬀord (1991) and Robinson and Godbey (1997).
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We derive the equilibrium as the solution to a social planning problem that maxi-
mizes the utility function of a representative agent. Equilibrium is defined as a set of
dynamic paths for the allocation of capital and time to the three market sectors, home
production and non-work time (leisure), and the allocation of the output of each sector
to consumption and capital. The utility function of the infinitely-lived representative
agent is
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [lnφ(.) + v (1− l)] dt (1)
where l ∈ (0, 1) are per capita hours of total work (market and home), v (.) is the utility
of leisure, with v0 > 0, v00 < 0, and v0 →∞ as l → 1, and φ(.) is a CES aggregate over
final consumption goods, defined by:
φ (.) =
Ã P
i=a,m,s
ωic
(ε−1)/ε
i
!ε/(ε−1)
. (2)
ci is the per capita consumption of a composite good, one each for agriculture, manu-
facturing and services, ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between these composites,
and ωi > 0,
P
ωi = 1. The consumption composites are combinations of the output
of the market and home sectors for each good, respectively distinguished by a second
subscript, j = m,h :
ci =
h
ψic
(σi−1)/σi
im + (1− ψi)c
(σi−1)/σi
ih
iσi/(σi−1)
i = a,m, s. (3)
Here, ψi ∈ (0, 1), cij ≥ 0 ∀i, j and σi > 0. The restrictions on the utility function are
a combination of suﬃcient restrictions consistent with steady-state growth when leisure
is endogenous and there are many consumption goods, previously derived by King et al.
(1988) and Ngai and Pissarides (2004).
A key assumption is
R1 : σi > 1 > ε ∀i. (4)
It implies that market and home-produced goods are close substitutes for each other
but the agricultural, manufacturing and service goods are not close substitutes for each
other. Generally, the three composite goods are distinct goods that households want
to consume in near-constant proportions, but within each composite goods are only
marginally diﬀerentiated and larger substitutions take place. We discuss some more
evidence supporting R1 in section 3.2.
Our measure of total time is the total time available to the population who can work.
We let lij denote the share of that time allocated to each of the six production activities.
Total market employment is
P
∀i lim ≡ q, which, in the absence of unemployment, is
also the conventional definition of aggregate labour supply. Market employment shares
are then defined by lim/q, for i = a,m, s. Facts about the aggregate labour supply are
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statements about the evolution of q, whereas structural change refers to changes in the
market shares lim/q.
Production functions are identical in all activities except for their TFP parameters
Aij, which are Hicks-neutral:
F ij = AijF (lijkij, lij) ; A˙ij/Aij = γij i = a,m, s, j = m,h. (5)
The production function F has constant returns to scale, positive and diminishing re-
turns to inputs, and satisfies the Inada conditions; kij is the capital-labour ratio and Aij
is TFP in each sector, with growth rate γij.
All sectors produce consumption goods but only manufacturing produces capital
goods. For convenience we split manufacturing into two sub-sectors, one producing con-
sumption goods and the other producing only capital goods, with the same technology.
With some abuse of notation we distinguish by subscriptsmm the component used in the
production of consumption goods only and bymk the component used in the production
of capital goods. Because we are assuming constant-returns technologies and free factor
mobility, this is equivalent to assuming one manufacturing sector whose output can be
either consumed or invested:
cim = Aimlimf(kim) i = a,m, s, (6)
cih = Aihlihf (kih) i = a,m, s, (7)
K˙ = Ammlmkf (kmk)− (δ + ν)K, (8)P
lij = l, i = a,m, s, j = m,h, k, (9)P
lijkij = lk, i = a,m, s, j = m,h, k; (10)
where in general f(k) ≡ F (k, 1), δ is the capital depreciation rate, ν is the population
growth rate, k is the ratio of the capital stock to hours of “total work” (the sum of market
and home hours) and K is the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the population (so
k = K/l).
We obtain optimal allocations by maximizing the utility function in (1) subject to
(5)-(10). The maximization can be described over three levels. At the highest level,
the agent chooses a path for aggregate consumption (essentially for our composite φ),
hours of total work and the aggregate capital stock. Next, the aggregate capital stock
and total work are allocated between the three composites ci (i = a,m, s) and capital
production. And finally, the allocation to each ci is divided between market and home
production. The conditions giving the allocations in the last two layers are “static”. We
start with the lowest level, the allocation between home and market, and move to the
highest.
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2.1 Optimal allocations between market and home: marketi-
zation
Suppose that the agent has allocated labour li and capital per hour ki to the production
of consumption composite ci.What is the optimal allocation of these between home and
market production? To find the answer we maximize (3) separately for each i subject
to the production functions in (6) and (7) and:
li ≥ lih + lim, (11)
liki ≥ lihkih + limkim. (12)
Optimal allocations satisfy the first-order conditions
ψi
1− ψi
µ
cim
cih
¶−1/σi
=
Aih
Aim
, (13)
kim = kih. (14)
Free capital and labour mobility imply that production eﬃciency is achieved at all times
with equal capital-labour ratios between the home and the market. We can therefore
drop the second subscript and write ki for the common capital-labour ratio in sector i (in
manufacturing it will be optimal to have the same capital-labour ratio in the production
for capital goods, as we show below). Making use of the production functions and
(13)-(14) we obtain:
lih
lim
=
µ
1− ψi
ψi
¶σi µAim
Aih
¶1−σi
. (15)
Equation (15) contains the important “marketization” result of this paper: Because
the relative TFP levels are changing over time, the employment shares in market and
home production are also changing. By diﬀerentiation with respect to time we obtain:
l˙im
lim
− l˙ih
lih
= (σi − 1)(γim − γih). (16)
With σi > 1, and if TFP in the market sector is rising faster than in the home sector,
the home sector is losing labour to the market sector. It implies that if the TFP growth
rate of the market sector remains above the TFP growth rate of the home sector for a
suﬃciently long time, eventually the home sector will vanish and all consumption goods
will be produced in the market. This is the basis of our claims about the marketization
of all home production of agricultural and manufacturing goods. We return later in the
paper to a discussion of the conditions needed for these results and to the question of
the marketization of service production.
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From (15) we obtain the share of home production in composite good i :
lih
li
=
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1
1 +
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1 . (17)
We give it here for future reference.
2.2 Optimal sectoral allocations: structural transformation
We now consider optimal allocations at the level of the composite sector. The analysis
of the preceding section enables us to implement a convenient aggregation. Making use
of (13) and (3) we derive the optimal relation between the consumption composite ci
and the part of it produced in the market:
ci = z
σi
i cim (18)
zi ≡ ψ1/(σi−1)i
"
1 +
µ
1− ψi
ψi
¶σi µAih
Aim
¶σi−1#1/(σi−1)
. (19)
We note that zi depends only on parameters and it is a function of time because of its
dependence on the ratio of home to market TFP. Similarly, from (15) we can write the
aggregate li allocated to sector i in terms of the market allocation:
li = lim + lih = ψ
−1
i z
σi−1
i lim. (20)
Therefore, we can aggregate the production functions in (6) and (7) into one for the
composite ci :
ci = ψiziAimlif (ki) i = a,m, s. (21)
Maximization at the level of the sector takes place by maximizing φ(.) in (2) for
given l and k, with controls ci, li, ki, lmk and kmk. The constraints are (21) and as before,
(8)-(10), noting that lim + lih = li and kim = kih.
Maximization with respect to the factor inputs yields
kmk = ki = k i = a,m, s, (22)
so capital-labour ratios are common in all production activities. Maximization over the
consumption allocations yields,
φi
φj
=
ψjzjAjm
ψiziAim
i, j = a, s,m, (23)
12
where the notation is in general φi = ∂φ/∂ci. Given the definition of φ in (2), we can
write
ci
cj
=
µ
ωiψiziAim
ωjψjzjAjm
¶ε
, (24)
and from this equation and (21) we can get:
li
lj
=
µ
ωi
ωj
¶εµψjzjAjm
ψiziAim
¶1−ε
. (25)
This equation is the basis of the structural transformation force. Traditionally, structural
transformation is discussed in the context of market hours of work only. For market hours
the equation is derived from (25) by making use of (17):
lim
ljm
=
µ
ωiψi
ωjψj
¶ε zσj−εj
z
σi−ε
i
µ
Ajm
Aim
¶1−ε
. (26)
We note that if there is no home production of goods i and j, i.e., if ψi = ψj = 1, then
zi = zj = 1, equations (25) and (26) become identical and the structural transformation
force is:
l˙i
li
− l˙j
lj
= (1− ε)(γjm − γim). (27)
For ε < 1, sectors with fast TFP growth are losing labour share to sectors with low
TFP growth, unlike the marketization force, which gives a movement in the opposite
direction.
When there is home production the dynamics of zi also matter in sectoral allocations.
By diﬀerentiation of the expression for zi in (19) we obtain:
z˙i
zi
= (γih − γim)
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1
1 +
³
1−ψi
ψi
´σi ³ Aih
Aim
´σi−1 (28)
= (γih − γim)
lih
li
, (29)
where use has been made of (17). Bringing now results together, by diﬀerentiating (25)
with respect to time and making use of (29), we obtain:
l˙i
li
− l˙j
lj
= (1− ε)
¡
γj − γi
¢
i, j = a,m, s. (30)
γj ≡
µ
1− ljh
lj
¶
γjm +
ljh
lj
γjh. (31)
13
A comparison with (27) shows that when there is a home sector the TFP growth rates
of the market sectors are replaced by the weighted average of the TFP growth rates of
the market and home sector. It is clear from the definition of γj that we need some
quantitative restrictions on TFP growth rates to sign the direction of labour movement.
We return to this question in section 3.
We now solve for the sectoral distribution of employment and capital for given ag-
gregate l and k. From (22), capital is distributed such that capital-labour rations are
equal in all sectors. But given kmk = k, employment in the capital-producing sector
is immediately obtained by inverting the production function, since the output of the
sector is given by the assumption, made so far, that the path of the aggregate capital
stock is given. Therefore, the distribution of employment in the consumption-producing
sectors satisfies equations (25) for a given total allocation of time l − lmk. The solution
for each sector’s employment follows immediately:
li
l − lmk
=
ωεi (ψiziAim)
−1+εP
∀j ω
ε
j
¡
ψjzjAjm
¢−1+ε (32)
With knowledge of li the hours of work in market and home production are obtained
from (20), completing the description of equilibrium at this level.
2.3 Aggregate growth
Aggregate equilibrium is obtained by defining per capita aggregate consumption of all
goods in terms of the manufacturing market price. The objective is to aggregate up
from the composite goods such that the utility function (1) and dynamic constraint (8)
become functions of aggregate consumption, the aggregate capital stock and non-work
time.
We first obtain the aggregate utility function. Because of the competitive allocations
that we have assumed, the price of consumption composite i in terms of the manu-
facturing market price is equal to the marginal rate of substitution φi/φmm. We define
aggregate per capita consumption as follows:
c ≡
P
i=a,m,s
µ
φi
φm
¶µ
φm
φmm
¶
ci. (33)
The first MRS is obtained from (23) and the second by diﬀerentiation of (2) and (3) and
use of (18). The relative price of composite i to the manufacturing market price that we
obtain is Amm/(ψiziAim). From (21) we then derive:
c = Ammf(k)(l − lmk). (34)
From (21) again and (32) we obtain
ci
c
=
(ωiψiziAim)
ε
Amm
P
∀j ω
ε
j
¡
ψjzjAjm
¢ε−1 . (35)
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We use (35) to substitute all ci out of φ. Because φ is homogeneous of degree 1 we can
write φ = cφ˜(.), where φ˜(.) is a function of parameters (albeit changing over time).
The aggregate constraints are (34), the definition k = K/l, and (8). We substitute
(34) into (8) to obtain the single constraint that describes the evolution of the aggregate
state variable:
K˙ = Ammlf (K/l)− c− (δ + ν)K. (36)
We also define the new maximand, derived from (1) and φ(.) = cφ˜(.),
U˜ =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [ln c+ v (1− l)] dt. (37)
Aggregate equilibrium is defined as the paths of c, l and K that maximize (37) subject
to (36).
Inspection of the maximization problem shows that it has the structure of the max-
imization problem of the one-sector Ramsey economy, except for one diﬀerence: tech-
nological growth in the Ramsey economy needs to be labour-augmenting but here it
is Hicks-neutral. We therefore assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
which make the two equivalent: f(k) = kα. Under this assumption there are unique
convergent paths for c, l and K and a balanced-growth equilibrium with l constant and
c and K growing at the rate of labour-augmenting productivity growth in manufactur-
ing, γmm/(1− α). Once the equilibrium paths for the aggregates are known, the rest of
the model is solved by working backwards through our derivations: the evolution of the
consumption composites is given by (35) and their breakdown between home and market
consumption by (18). The capital-labour ratio in all production activities is given by
k = K/l and the evolution of hours of work used in the production of capital goods
by (8). With knowledge of l and lmk, (32) gives employment in the production of each
composite good i and (17) gives its breakdown between home and market, completing
the description of equilibrium.
3 Empirical implications and other properties
3.1 Qualitative properties and aggregate facts
It is straightforward to show with standard techniques that the stationary equilibrium
of the aggregate maximization problem is saddlepath-stable. In a diagram with hours of
work on the vertical axis and capital per eﬃciency unit on the horizontal the saddlepath
is downward-sloping, which implies that in the adjustment to equilibrium hours of work
are falling. But given our interest in long-run trends, it is more interesting to look at
the properties of steady-state equilibrium. On the steady state hours of total work are
constant. We still get changing hours of market work which are compensated by changes
in hours of home production.
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There is a close relation in our model between consumption and non-work time, given
by
c
y
=
1− α
v0 (1− l) l , (38)
where y is aggregate per capita output, defined analogously to aggregate per capita
consumption, in terms of the manufacturing market price:
y = c+Ammlmkkα = Ammlkα. (39)
Since in this expression Ammkα−1 is constant in the steady state, lmk must also be con-
stant and y, c and k growing at the same rate. So the following allocations are constant
in our steady state: total hours of work allocated to the production of consumption
goods, total hours allocated to the production of capital goods and total hours of non-
work time. But market hours are defined by q ≡
P
∀i lim+ lmk, and so are changing over
time.
If we restrict attention to the market sector, we find that the capital-output ratio
is also constant and output per hour growing at constant rate. The aggregate capital
stock in the market sector is given by
Kmarket =
P
∀i
(lim + lmk)k = qk, (40)
and so the market capital-labour ratio, Kmarket/q is simply k. Market output in this
economy is
ymarket =
P
∀i
µ
φim
φmm
¶
Aimk
αlim +Ammk
αlmk = qAmmk
α (41)
and so market output per hour, ymarket/q is growing at the same constant rate as the
other aggregates and the capital-output ratio in the market economy is constant. This
confirms our claim that our economy satisfies Kaldor’s stylized facts of aggregate bal-
anced growth, despite the changes in labour supply.
We now discuss some important qualitative properties of hours of work by making
the following assumptions on productivity growth rates:
R2m : γam ≥ γmm > γsm
R2h : γim ≥ γih ∀i.
R2m is consistent with the observed fact that the price of services is rising faster, and
the price of agricultural goods slower, than the price of manufacturing goods.13 The
ranking in R2m is also consistent with the direct estimates of Jorgensen and Gallop
13It is straightforward to show that in our model relative prices are equal to the inverse of relative
TFP levels because of free factor mobility and the assumed production functions.
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(1992) for the period 1947-85 and Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) for 1959-1995. R2h is
more diﬃcult to justify with hard empirical estimates, although it should be true, on the
grounds that the market can replicate a home technology but not vice versa. Anecdotal
evidence in its favour abounds, as for example the statements by Reid (1934) and others
cited in section 1 for manufacturing.
Assumption R2h implies that over time the home production of goods should be
transferred to the market. Equation (16) shows that the marketization force is stronger
the closer substitutes home-produced goods are to market-produced goods and the bigger
the diﬀerence between their TFP growth rates. Assumption R2m and (27) imply that
in the absence of home production agriculture should be losing hours to manufacturing
and services and manufacturing should be losing hours to services. A suﬃcient condition
that home production does not reverse the direction of structural change dictated by
the market TFP levels is that the diﬀerentials γim − γih have the same ranking as the
market TFP growth rates, which is plausible. But because the weight of the home sector
in γj becomes progressively smaller over time through the marketization force, there is a
point after which the market TFP growth rates dominate in the evolution of employment
shares whatever the ranking of the home TFP levels.
The evidence that we examined in section 1 indicated that the home production of
agricultural goods in the United States virtually disappeared by 1930. This suggests that
home production of agricultural goods has had too small a share in overall agricultural
employment to make a diﬀerence to the structural transformation out of agriculture,
and at least since 1930 we can assume that the number of hours allocated to agricultural
home production is practically zero. Similarly, the evidence on the home production of
manufactured goods is that by 1930 it was overtaken by market production because of
technological improvements in the market. This mechanism is precisely the one in our
model. As with agriculture, it again suggests that after industrialization, the home sector
in manufacturing became too small to make a diﬀerence in the employment reallocations
dictated by market TFP levels across sectors.
But time use surveys show substantial home production of services. Why did agricul-
tural and manufacturing home production vanish so fast and yet service home production
is surviving in such big numbers? The reason is found in the way that the marketization
and structural transformation forces combine to cause sector employment dynamics.
Looking at agriculture, we argued that it has the highest TFP growth rate, so the sector
overall is losing hours at fast rate. Moreover, the output of home production and market
production are likely to be very close substitutes, and TFP in the market, because of
economies of scale, is likely to be growing much faster than the productivity of food
production at home. So in agriculture both the marketization force and the structural
transformation force are likely to be strong and work against home production, which
is likely to disappear fast.
Similarly in manufacturing, the output of the home sector is likely to be a very
close substitute to the output of home production (e.g., home-made versus ready-made
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clothes), and technology in the market is likely to have risen much faster than in the
home after the industrial revolution. For both these reasons, the marketization force
in manufacturing is likely to be strong. But manufacturing as a whole gains labour
at first from agriculture, so at least when there is a substantial agricultural sector,
the structural transformation force is not strongly against home production. In the
early stages of industrialization there is a tension between the two forces in the home
production of manufacturing goods, the transformation out of agriculture pushing for
a rise in both market and home hours and technological improvements in the market
pushing for a rise in market hours and a fall in home hours. Eventually, however, and
as the share of agricultural employment shrinks, manufacturing as a whole has to lose
labour to services. So although we may not see the home production of manufacturing
goods fall rapidly at first, it is likely to be marketized fast during the industrialization
process. We argued in section 1 that early time use surveys show some home production
of manufacturing goods in the very early part of the 20th century, when the home
production of agricultural goods had for practical purposes vanished. But by 1930 home
production of manufacturing goods had also practically disappeared.
In contrast to agriculture and manufacturing, market-produced services are not likely
to be as close a substitute for home-produced services. Whereas the outputs of agricul-
ture and manufacturing are “standardized,” service output is more diverse. For example,
child care, looking after needy relatives and shopping for one’s own clothes are not stan-
dardized activities that have very close substitutes provided by the market. Equally
importantly, because TFP growth in the production of market services is low, the mar-
ketization force for home services is likely to be weak. Opposing this weak force against
home hours, there is a strong structural transformation force increasing hours of total
work spent on services. The net eﬀect on home-produced services is ambiguous, but if
it is positive, it is so when agriculture or manufacturing are shedding a lot of labour,
which makes the structural transformation force stronger. Eventually, when the struc-
tural transformation force weakens through the diminishing importance of agriculture
and manufacturing, the marketization force takes over, leading to a shrinkage in the
home sector. So in contrast to home-produced food and manufacturing goods, we are
likely to observe a non-monotonic, most likely hump-shaped path for hours of work spent
on home-produced services. Moreover, the marketization of home services is likely to be
weak, and so the fall in home hours in the later stages of economic growth is likely to
be slow, because of both a small substitution elasticity and small productivity-growth
diﬀerentials between market and home. Sub-sectors within services that have either no
close substitutes in the market or have practically zero TFP growth in both the market
and the home, such as aspects of child care, may never marketize completely.
Figure 2 is for the United States and shows the trends in market hours of work
and in the market employment shares of the three industrial sectors.14 Our model’s
14The series for market hours in figure 2 is not the same as the one shown in figure 1, which is for
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predictions are consistent with the broad trends that we see in the figure. The sectoral
shares are consistent with the assumptions of low substitutability between their final
products and the ranking of their TFP growth rates. Manufacturing employment does
not fall as rapidly as agricultural employment because it produces capital goods that
are needed by the expanding (market and home) service sector. More interestingly,
our model’s predictions are consistent with what we see in total market hours. In the
early part of the twentieth century the home production of all goods is still active and
the employment share of agriculture is high. Both the marketization and structural
transformation forces are likely to be strong and acting in opposite directions, so a likely
outcome is the absence of any significant net impact on total market hours, as shown in
the figure. According to our model, in this period the home production of agriculture
and manufacturing should be losing hours fast but the home production of services
should be gaining them. In the middle years, which cover the middle two quarters
of the century, the home production of agricultural and manufacturing practically had
disappeared, but the structural transformation force out of agriculture was still strong
because of the relative size of this sectors. In these circumstances the prediction of our
model is that the structural transformation force should dominate the marketization of
services, and so the hours allocated to the home production of services should be rising
and total hours of work falling. Again, this is consistent with what we see in the figure.
But eventually the structural transformation force weakens because of the shrinkage of
agricultural employment, and the marketization of services takes over. The impact on
overall market work should be a rise in hours, especially by women, who performed the
home tasks before marketization.
3.2 Quantitative implications
Having established that the broad trends in the data are qualitatively consistent with
the model’s predictions, we investigate here more closely its quantitative implications.
We focus on the period since 1930, when the home production of agriculture and man-
ufacturing plays no role in the dynamics. This finesses the problem of having to choose
parameters for the utility function and home production functions for agricultural and
manufacturing goods. We choose the following parameters in our model to eliminate
home production of agricultural and manufacturing goods: ψi = 1 for i = a,m, which
comparable cross-country data, because of diﬀerences in coverage. The series shown in figure 2 are
due to Ramey and Francis (2006) and are more general. They include unpaid family workers, self-
employed, government employment and commuting time (which is a constant 10 percent of the sum
of the previous three). The source for the employment shares is the Bureau of Economic Analysis for
1929-2004 and Historical Statistics for the United States for 1899, 1909, 1919. The graph is plotted by
interpolation between the data points. Agriculture includes agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry
includes mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities, transportation and communication and services
all others.
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imply za = zm = 1. With market sectors only for these goods, we use γa and γm to
denote their TFP growth rates.
We compare our model’s predictions with the US time series under the assumption
that the economy is on the balanced growth path that solves the maximization of (37)
subject to (36). Restrictions R1, R2m and R2h still hold. We have shown analytically
that under the assumption σs > 1 > ε and γa ≥ γm > γsm ≥ γsh, the steady state of
our model generates trends in total hours and employment shares that are qualitatively
consistent with the trends in the data. The objective of this section is to choose plausible
parameter values to show that the analytical results are also quantitatively consistent
with data for these four series.
In the steady state, given any initial values for the allocation of hours to the three
market sectors and home production, the model requires six parameters to predict their
entire time path. Two parameters are the elasticities of substitution, ε and σs. The next
three parameters are diﬀerences in TFP growth rates, γa−γm, γm−γsm and γsm− γsh.
The last parameter is the steady state investment rate, η, which gives the employment
share of capital production.
The parameter σs is the elasticity of substitution between service and home goods.
Estimates in the literature are for the elasticity of substitution between aggregate market
goods and service goods and they are in the range 1.5 to 2.3 (see Rupert, Rogerson and
Wright 1995, McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright 1997 and Chang and Schorfheide 2003).
As in our model σs is the elasticity of substitution between home and a smaller set of
goods, our σs should be at least as large as the existing estimates. We choose the biggest
of these estimates, σs = 2.3.
For the elasticity of substitution ε we do not have direct estimates. It is clear from
(24) that in a model without home production, and because relative prices are inversely
related to relative TFP levels, the own price elasticity of the three goods is −ε. It is
also clear from (25) that in this case the slope of the regression line between changes in
relative employment levels and changes in relative prices should be 1−ε. But with home
production, and because at least some market-produced services have good substitutes
in home-produced services, the estimated price elasticity should be higher than −ε in
absolute value. Falvey and Gemmell (1996) estimate the price elasticity of the entire
service sector and they find it to be −0.3. They compare their estimate to one by
Summers (1985), which is −0.06 and not significantly diﬀerent from zero. Blundell et al.
(1993) report a “services” price elasticity for Britain of −0.7. However, they do not give
a list of what services are included and since the budget share of their services is only
0.12, it must be a very small list. Their estimate is comparable to the estimates obtained
by Falvey and Gemmell (1996) for each of their seven sub-sectors, whose budget shares
are on average of the same order of magnitude as the Blundell et al. (1993) sector. In a
model with home production, the estimate ε = 0.3 seems to be an upper bound for the
elasticity of substitution, with 0 as lower bound.
With regard to the relation between employment and price changes, we regressed
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relative employment changes and relative price changes for thirteen 2-digit consumption-
goods sectors drawn from the OECD STAN database and input-output tables for 1977-
2001, and obtained an average estimate 1 − ε = 0.7.15 Given the broader aggregation
in this paper, the estimate ε = 0.3 again emerges as an upper bound for the elasticity.
Following these findings, we selected ε = 0.1 as a good guess for the benchmark elasticity
of substitution between our three sectors.
We use the link between relative prices and TFP levels to derive the diﬀerences
in TFP growth rates. They are set to match the changes in the prices of agriculture
and service goods relative to manufacturing goods. We first compute annual growth
rates for each year, then take the average for the entire period. This average is 0.93
per cent for the price ratio of services to manufacturing and −1.2 for the price ratio
of agriculture to manufacturing.16 These two numbers are consistent with the direct
estimates of Jorgenson and Gallop (1992), who calculate an average TFP growth rate
for the period 1947-85 of 2.06 per cent for agriculture and 0.82 per cent for the private
non-farm sector.17 Within their non-farm sectors, TFP growth rates vary but the TFP
growth rates for industrial sectors are in general higher than the ones for service sectors.
We cannot adopt the same methodology to calibrate γsm − γsh as there are no esti-
mates on the implicit price of home goods. We reason as follows. Given the observed
rate of growth of aggregate labour productivity of 2 per cent and a capital share of 1/3,
a plausible estimate of manufacturing TFP growth is γm = 1.33 per cent. If we subtract
from this our computed diﬀerence between manufacturing and services, 0.93, we find
γsm = 0.4 per cent (which is also consistent with the direct estimates of Jorgenson and
Gallop 1992 and Jorgensen and Stiroh 2000). Thus, the maximum diﬀerence between
the TFP growth rates of market and home production consistent with non-negative TFP
growth in the home sector is 0.4 per cent. Of course, negative TFP growth in the home
sector is not inconsistent with our model or with rising labour productivity, because ac-
cumulation of consumer durables could oﬀset it.18 Nevertheless, we use γsm−γsh = 0.004
15These results are available in the longer version of Ngai-Pissarides (2004) that circulated as CEPR
discussion paper no. 4763 and on our personal web sites.
16Source for 1929-1970: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1
and 2. The implicit price deflator for services in series E17, and the wholesale price index for industrial
commodities and farm products in series E24-25. For 1970-2000, see Economic Report of the President,
Tables B-62 and B-67. The measurement of both prices and TFP, especially in the earlier period, is
fraught with diﬃculties, so we use the same TFP diﬀerences for the whole period, rather than looking
at diﬀerent sub-periods, even though our balanced growth path allows γsm and γa to change over time.
17The numbers are obtained from adding the productivity growth rates due to input quality adjust-
ment from Table 4 to the TFP growth rates in Table 1, 1.58 for agriculture and 0.44 for the non-farm
sector.
18The capital-labour ratio in home production is k, the same as in the market, and so it grows at
positive rate γm/(1− α). “Real” labour productivity in home production is Ahkα, which grows at rate
αγm/(1−α)+γsh, so a negative γsh is consistent with positive rate of growth of real labour productivity.
Of course, as in the other sectors, the value of average product in the home sector (with manufacturing
as numeraire) grows at rate γm and the implicit price of home-produced goods rises at rate γm − γsh.
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Table 3: Baseline Parameters, United States, 1930-2000
η σs ε γm−γa γm−γsm γsm − γsh
0.104 2.3 0.1 −0.012 0.0093 0.004
as our benchmark.
Finally, the steady-state investment rate is η = ηm/ (1 + lsh/q) , where ηm is the
investment (or saving) as a fraction of market production, which we get from Maddison
(1992). To minimize the role of the Great Depression on the average savings rate, we
use the average of 1925-30 as an estimate for 1930, so ηm0 = 0.189. To compute η we
also need the initial home-to-market hour (lsh0/q0). We obtain this ratio from home and
market hours data recently construed by Ramey and Francis (2006). To be consistent,
we also use the average of 1925-30 as an estimate for 1930, to obtain lsh0/q0 = 0.812.
Therefore, η = 0.104. The calibrated benchmark values are shown in Table 3.
To construct the entire predicted path for hours since 1930 we need 1930 values for
hours of work in the three market sectors and in home production. The 1930 value for
the market shares and market hours are shown in figure 2. For home production we
used the Ramey and Francis (2006) estimate. Because home hours in 1930 may not be
accurately measured, we also experimented with initial values that are ±20 per cent of
the Ramey-Francis data point, with virtually no impact in our predictions (the impact
was too small to show on the graph below).
The results of calibrating the model are shown in figure 3. The model tracks the
dynamics of employment shares very well, picking up the fast rise of service employ-
ment and the fall in agricultural employment, with smaller changes in manufacturing.
With respect to total market hours, the model generates a very shallow U-shape when
compared to the data. Not surprisingly, it does not track the changes in hours in the
Great Depression and the war, but it picks up the downward trend up to the mid 1970s
and the rise in the last quarter century. In 1930 hours of work were 28.4 per week. In
1975-84, when hours reached their lowest point, they were on average 26.6 per week.
The model predicts a fall to 27.4 hours. By 1995-04, hours of work increased back to
28.3 per week, and the model predicts 27.7 per week. As we pointed out, predicting the
turning point as part of the same dynamic process is unique to our model, but it is clear
from the results that the productivity explanation is not the only explanation for the
observed low-frequency fluctuations in hours of work.19
19Raising σs in these calculations reduces the extent of the fall in hours but increases the subsequent
rise; increasing the productivity diﬀerentials between agriculture, manufacturing and services gives a
bigger fall between 1930 and the 1970s but a subsequent rise of the same order of magnitude.
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4 More on the economics of leisure
We have treated non-work time so far as in conventional growth and real business cycle
models, as leisure time that yields utility directly, without the help of any goods. But
a large amount of leisure in time use surveys is enjoyed with the use of some capital or
intermediate goods, such as watching TV, surfing the net or talking on the telephone.
We generalize our benchmark model by introducing a leisure good cl that is produced
mostly at home using time and capital goods.20 One important outcome of this extension
is that now changes in leisure time can also cause changes in labour supply, even if the
economy is on a balanced growth path.
We assume that leisure is of two types, one as in the benchmark model and one that is
the output of a “production” process that uses capital and labour through a production
function that is identical to the one for other goods. We use subscript l for leisure-
goods production and let Al denote its TFP level. We assume that the leisure good (say
TV viewing services) is a better substitute for service goods than it is for agricultural
and manufacturing goods. But it is not as good a substitute for market services as
home production is. This is the main feature that diﬀerentiates home production from
leisure production. Home production such as cooked food has market-produced close
substitutes but leisure production such as TV viewing does not have close substitutes
in the market; if an individual hires somebody to do her TV viewing for her the end
product will not be a close substitute to watching the TV herself. Yet both cooked
food and TV viewing are produced at home with some durable good purchased from the
manufacturing sector.
Formally, we assume that the services aggregate now consists of three goods, market
services and home production as before, combined into cs as in the benchmark model,
and leisure goods, which are combined with cs into a grand service good, cS. We want
the elasticity of substitution between cs and cl to be bigger than the one between service
goods and manufacturing goods (our ε) but smaller than the elasticity of substitution
between market and home produced services (our σs).We choose it to be 1, which gives
a particularly simple and appealing result on the dynamics of leisure time. But the
model also has a solution if the elasticity is bigger or smaller than one.
The utility of goods now is,
φ (.) =
³P
ωjc
(ε−1)/ε
j
´ε/(ε−1)
j = a,m, S; cS = c1−ξs c
ξ
l , (42)
20In time use surveys by far the dominant good of the kind that we have in mind is watching TV.
See below in this section for some data. Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005) also put forward the
idea that the dynamics of leisure time are influenced by the complementarities between durables and
time. Their approach, however, is diﬀerent from ours. They claim that leisure has increased because
the quality and variety of goods like TV, which are complementary to leisure time, has gone up. Our
claim runs along the lines of our previous discussion, people consume more time watching TV and doing
other similar things because technological progress elsewhere has increased their consumption of other
goods and other goods are poor substitutes for TV watching time.
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with cs defined as before, as a CES between csm and csh with elasticity σs. This specifi-
cation reduces to the benchmark model when ξ → 0. The marketization conditions (15)
still hold between the market and home production of service goods. By direct extension
a similar condition holds between the service composite cs and leisure production cl :
ll
ls
=
ξ
1− ξ . (43)
This is an important result that is due to our unit elasticity assumption for cs and cl :
the ratio of leisure-production time to service-production time is a constant. The size of
the constant depends on the parameter ξ. It should be obvious and it is straightforward
to show that all the other results of the benchmark model still hold, with the composite
cS replacing cs. The composite cS now has two “marketization” forces beneath it, the
one between market production and home production which holds as before, and the
one between leisure and the other two service sectors, given by (43). The aggregates
(consumption, income and capital stock) are still defined as before and a balanced growth
path with constant capital-output ratio exists. The new element is that on this steady
state total leisure is now defined as (1 − l) + ll, and it is not constant because of the
dynamics of ll.
As in the benchmark model and for as long as TFP growth in agriculture and manu-
facturing exceed TFP growth in the service sectors, service employment is monotonically
increasing over time. Now because of (43), ll is also monotonically increasing over time.
Thus, total leisure time, 1−l+ll, is increasing over time, with l constant on the balanced
growth path and ll rising. We address two questions about this dynamic. First, how big
is the share of leisure in time use surveys now and how big is it in the asymptotic state?
This will give an idea of the dynamics involved. Second, what happens to overall labour
supply when there is leisure production?
The answer to the first question depends mainly on the preference parameter ξ.
This is because both the current and asymptotic ll are a constant fraction ξ/(1 − ξ)
of service employment. In the American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) of 2003 and 2004
there is a fairly detailed breakdown of the activities in which people engage in their
leisure time. We include under our leisure production TV watching, sports participation
and telephone, mail and email and we find that individuals over the age of 15 spend
about 21 hours a week in these activities. Total leisure time is about 39 hours and
total work time (market and home) 50 hours.21 Making use of the data on home and
market production from the same surveys we get an approximate value of ξ = 1/3. In the
asymptotic steady state our model prediction (on the assumption that the time devoted
to the other activities mentioned in the preceding footnote remains the same) is that
total work converges to 44 hours and total leisure time to 45 hours. So the prediction is
21The remainder is spent on essential activities like sleep, 74 hours, education, 3.5 hours and unclas-
sified items, 1.5 hours.
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that once the structural transformation and marketization forces run their course, there
will be a net shift of 6 hours a week from work to leisure activities. It is also predicted
that the shift will take a very long time to complete because of the small diﬀerentials in
the TFP growth rates.
Labour supply with leisure production is q = l − lh − ll. Since home production
converges to zero and leisure converges to a constant, labour supply must also converge
to a constant. Leisure is rising throughout the adjustment to the asymptotic steady
state, whereas we have argued that the structural transformation and marketization
forces that drive labour supply in the benchmark first lower labour supply and then
increase it. So with leisure production the predicted initial fall in labour supply is faster
and due to both the rise in leisure and the rise in home production, whereas in the second
phase, when labour supply increases, the rise would be mitigated. Two forces are acting
against each other in the second phase, the marketization of home production pushes for
a rise in labour supply and the rise in leisure for a fall. With the parameter values used
in our benchmark calibrations and ξ set equal to 1/3, the marketization force dominates
and labour supply is on a very slowly increasing trend.22
5 Conclusions
We have shown that a unified framework can simultaneously account for structural
change between agriculture, industry and services and a changing trend in aggregate
hours of work without violating balanced aggregate growth. Our prediction of the co-
existence of a changing trend in hours on the one hand and balanced aggregate growth
on the other is new to a model of economic growth. The assumptions that drive our
results are (a) market goods are poor substitutes with each other but home-produced
goods have close substitutes in the market, and (b) agriculture and industry have higher
rates of total factor productivity growth than do services, but within each sector market
production has higher rate of TFP growth than home production. On the aggregate
economy’s balanced growth path the dynamics of aggregate market hours are driven by
the dynamics of home production, but oﬀ the steady state there are transitional dynam-
ics with leisure time rising and the supply of labour falling. We have also shown that an
extension which refines the use of leisure time and pays attention to the fact that most
leisure time is spent with some capital good, such as a TV set, has the implication that
leisure time is also rising over time on the balanced growth path.
The qualitative predictions of our model are consistent with the dynamics of hours
of work in the United States. Quantitative analysis shows that the model matches
well the dynamics of employment shares since 1930 and reasonably well the aggregate
dynamics. In particular, we explain a fall in market hours up to the 1970s and a rise
22This conclusion is consistent with the conclusion of Aguiar and Hurst (2005), who find that in
recent surveys the fall in home production time has been matched mainly by a rise in leisure time.
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since then. The recent rise of female employment is consistent with the marketization
of home production emphasized in this paper. Of course, this is not to suggest that no
other factor has contributed to the explanation of the dynamics of market hours of work.
We abstracted from international trade and all distortions to competitive market al-
locations. Distortions can influence the allocation of time between market and home and
trade aﬀects manufacturing and services diﬀerently, so it is likely to influence structural
change. European data show the same general patterns for market hours of work as
in the United States, but more recently with some delay in the marketization of home
production. We did not discuss in any detail reasons for these diﬀerences; taxation,
regulation such as restrictions in weekly hours of work and in shop opening times and
trade are likely to prove important in accounting for these diﬀerences. Future work
needs to enrich the technological explanation of trends that we have emphasized in this
paper with the introduction of taxes, regulation and international trade, especially is
cross-country diﬀerences are to be successfully explained (see Freeman and Schettkat,
2005, Prescott, 2004, Rogerson, 2004, and Messina, 2005, for related work).
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